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RESTRICTED 
PRO.BLEMS OF COMMAND AND LOGISTICS 
A lecture delivered by 
Vice Admi1'al Oscar C. Badger, U.S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
on 31 August 1950 
Admiral Cooley, students of the College: It is a great 
privilege for me. to come here this morning. I want to asEmre 
you that no one appreciates more than I do the contributions to 
the national security that have been made and are being made by 
this organization. I was just an ordinary line Naval officer until 
I was called into the logistic game in the middle of war-much to 
my personal disappointment because I was called in from an ex­
tensive sea command-but my resulting experiences certainly in­
tensified my interest in and appreciation of the vital importance of 
sound logistics. planning and implementation. I am glad that we 
in the higher echelons of all our Military Services have finally come 
to realize that a knowledge of the principles of logistics is a neces­
sary qualification for command of military forces. 
World War II really brought that about. Speaking of the 
Navy, we had a fine Supply Corps before World War II. The of­
ficers were men who had a good knowledge of how to get things, 
when to get them and how to distribute them. But the average 
line officer had but little interest in such matters. When World 
War II came, the situation was different from World War I in a 
manner not generally appreciated but which forced appreciation 
by all of the importance of logistics. 
World War I was, in many circles, considered an all-out war. 
Actually, it was a war with one major theater. The production 
Vice Admiral Badger is Commander Eastern Sea Frontier and has a wealth 
of e�rience in command and logistics. He is a graduate of Naval War 
College, class of 1939. 
RESTRICTED 13 
1
Badger: Problems of Command and Logistics
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
capacity of the United States was fully loaded but was, in gen­
eral, adequate to the needs of that war. But when World War II 
came into the picture, there were 11 major theaters. . Inadequacy 
of the production of the United States was felt in every high 
planning agency in this country. Teamwork and unification of ef­
fort became essential. We found that, instead of having plenty, 
in order to carry out our planned operations (even to a degree of 
50 per cent of the desired effort), we had to exercise the greatest 
economy during war. 
Therefore, my talk this morning will emphasize not only the 
need for knowledge in the high command of the principles of logis'­
tics but a few facts in regard to the relationship be�ween efficiency 
and effectiveness and economy in planning and execution. I also 
want to emphasize the avoidance of certain practices such as uni­
lateral and badly considered demands, in order that we may suc­
cessfully fight a future world war with which we may well be 
confronted. 
Before World War II, since logistics had been a fairly sim­
ple, one-theater, one-pipe-line business, with a possible feeling of 
adequacy of the production capacity of this country, the need for 
logistics planners taking a proper place in the sun was not brought 
into the foreground.. The imagination and the ideas of the oper­
ational and strategic planners were considered paramount and all 
that was necessary. The fellow carrying on supply, production and 
distribution existed just to carry out these imaginative and pos­
sibly well-considered plans. 
We found that we could not fight World War II in that man­
ner. We found that, instead of having supermen who could tell 
us what to do without serious reference to logistic!!J, one of the 
things of first importance was the consideration of the plan from 
the point of view of feasibility-feasibility of support, production, 
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shipping, and so on-together with consideration as to the timing 
of the execution of the various operations in order that big oper­
ations should not unduly overlap. It became evident that ship­
ping, for instance, could be used to support more than one oper­
ation by staggering deliveries, rather than being overloaded as . the 
result of an overlap. It became immediately evident, not only that 
the closest coordination between our strategic and logistics plan­
ners was required, but that they, in fact, had to have a perfect 
unity of thought. Any attempt to carry on a modern war with­
out the application of that principle will result in fatal inefficien­
cy and inadequacy of support for operations. 
Therefore, the first thing that I want to emphasize is that 
logistics considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of 
military planning during the process of preparation for war, but 
may well become the controlling element with relation to feasible 
and successful operation. 
I have mentioned the word "feasibility." I will use a few 
examples because I consider that to be a very important word. The 
thought behind it must be present in the minds of every military 
commander. 
In my opinion, the principal duty of the controlling logistics 
agency is to ensure that the operational and strategical plans are 
feasible. 
There are two kinds of logistics agencies. One is the top 
agency, the one that determines or approves operational plans so 
far as logistics is concerned. The other type of logistics agency 
is the implementing agency, which takes part after the operation 
has been approved. Although the former may oftentimes control 
the approval of operational plans on a basis of feasibility or iri­
f easibility, the latter is always the slave of approved plans and 
must implement them in an adequate and timely manner. 
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As an example of the first or high echelon type of logistics 
agency, we will consider the big meetings at Cairo. At Cairo, a 
great many strategic and operational plans were submitted. As you 
know, operational planning during the war was decentralized; plans 
were submitted to the JCS by the theater commanders. The op­
erational and strategic members of the JCS staff jointly with the 
logistic members looked them over from the broad angle of: "Does 
this suggested operation in such and· such a theater take a prop­
er and advantageous place in the early and successful completion 
of the war?" If, from a strategic and operational viewpoint,· and 
the objective viewpoint, there was approval, then it was laid aside 
as an approved strategic or operational plan for the Joint and Col!l­
bined Chiefs. I cannot tell you the exact number of such opera­
tions that were approved at_ Cairo from this objective viewpoint, 
but my guess now would be that there were approximately 28 to 
30. After that consi9-eration was completed, the Joint and Com­
bined Chiefs took 36 hours leave and went to Memphis. Before
l�aving, they turned these approved operations· over to the logis­
tics staff at Cairo and said, "Examine these for feasibility and
timing. When we return, let us know what you recommend that
we carry out."
I hope you realize the implication of the importance of logis­
tics under those circumstances and the control that the logistics 
people exercised in the final decisions of the Joint and Combined 
Chiefs; 
I will review, briefly, the suggested operations. Ming you, 
these were . not Combined Chiefs' plans. These were from the 
theaters: 
Normandy-fourth of May, 26 divisions. South of France 
-10 divisions, simultaneous landing on the same day and hour.
Italy-to proceed at its existing rate. Amphibious operation of
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about 14 divisions into the Aegean. The supply to Russia of 5.5 
million tons over the Caspian route, including the provision of tugs 
and barges built in the United States and shipped to the Persian 
Gulf and to the Caspian. The landing at Moulmein of about 10 
divisions to break the Japanese lines of communication to the Malay 
Peninsula and Burma. Incidental· operations on the Malay Penin­
sula, including an amphibious landing. The Pacific-to proceed ac­
cording to a schedule which I have forgotten, but which included 
the Philippines campaign, MacArthur having recommended a land­
ing on Mindanao on the first of July. In addition, there were in­
numerable smaller plans and OSS activities. Et cetera, et cetera. 
This is not complete. It is a rough outline. 
When the Joint and Combined Chiefs returned, they found 
the following recommendations: 
Normandy-okay; but instead of the Fourth of May, the 
fifth of June, because of the need for that time in the supply of cer­
tain critical items, the most important of which probably was land­
ing craft. South of France-because of the insufficiency of air f acil­
ities available and because of the logistics consideration of not 
wanting to divert air from England to the support of that opera­
tion, to delay it 15 days-or 45 days from the original date-instead 
of making it simultaneous, and to make the landing in darkness 
instead of in full moonlight. , Italy-to proceed. The Aegean­
eliminated entirely due to lack of logistics facilities, primarily land­
ing craft. Moulmein-after considering the failure of the Indian 
steel industry to produce steel plate locally, we had to abandon 
Moulmein for the same logistic reasons. MacArthur's landing on 
the first of July in Mindanao was to,o close to the fifth of June 
landing and, therefore, we could not build them both up simul­
taneously with the industrial capacity and shipping available. 
MacArthur's plan was delayed to any time after the first of Oc-
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tober so that the entire production of the United States could b� 
devoted to his support from the 15th of March and all available 
shipping, except for the normal support of Europe, could be di­
verted in that direction. The Pacific Fleet operations were gen­
erally restricted, if I remember correctly, to the 135th meridian 
prior to the landing of MacArthur in the Philippines. 
I merely mention that as a general outline to show the place 
that logistics planners assume during war. 
I sometimes read with a great deal of interest about the 
troubles we are having in order to maintain an Army, Navy and 
Air force in peacetime with 15 billion dollars. Maybe it is difficult. 
But, I want to say that the training, planning, and consideration 
involved in bringing the essentials into the picture under the peace­
time money limitation are not unlike the war requirements. In 
war, we. do expend many times more than 15 billion dollars a 
year, but we never have enough, and one of the most essential things 
to be carried in the mind of the logistician and the military com­
mander is the exercise of economy. I have just pointed out to you 
that, because of the inadequacy of logistic support, we had to 
abandon vitally important strategic objectives during the war. If 
we had not exercised the strictest economy and unification of 
thought and effort, we would not have been able to carry out suc­
cessfully even those objectives designated for accomplishment. 
Therefore, I want to impress upon you gentlemen, as one of 
the lessons that I have learned, that wastage of material or pro­
duction effort due to indifferent planning and consideration or the 
unilateral demand of one agency without consideration of the 
teamwork necessary between agencies has no place in military 
planning. It is a fatal defect. 
We had an example of unilateral planning during the war 
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we talk about unification of the Army, Navy and Air Force, that 
is the least we can expect. We must go further than that. We 
must not forget that during. the war we had to allocate steel, ma­
chinery, and engines to the Department of Agriculture and to all 
the other supporting civilian agencies that provided us with food 
and the other essential requirements not only of the armed but 
the civilian forces of the United States. So that unification of effort 
of the Armed Services is the minimum requirement. It is expand­
ed in time of war, and directly affects military planning by affect­
ing the availability of men, materials and facilities. 
The Maritime Commission was a separate agency. It had 
no representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Emory La.pd, a 
Naval officer and constructor, of high integrity and ability, com­
manding the respect of everybody, went to the President and got 
the President to sign an Executive order allocating 60 per cent of 
all plate steel to the Maritime Commission for the construction of 
merchant vessels. Therefore, 40 per cent of the plate steel, which, 
of course, was a critical item, had to be· divided· between the Army, 
Navy and Air Force, and it was inadequate. It was probably one of 
the most critical items during 1942 and 1943. There was a unilateral 
decision which was a serious one. 
The steel induf/try resisted increasing the production of plate 
steel above a million tons a month. Therefore, we· were going to 
Cairo,. with 400,000 tons of plate steel, knowing that the war effort 
was going to be completely curtailed unless the steel industry 
would agree to increase its production or a change was made in the 
" percentage of steel plate devoted to the Maritime · Commission · 
and/or the Army, Navy and Air Force. It was brought into unison 
by an interesting thing. Since I have gone this far, I will tell you 
t�e story. 
A proposal was made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff just be­
fore we went to Cairo that, in December of that year, the alloca-
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· tion of steel plate would be the same, 60 and 40; in January, it
would be 55 and 45 ; in February it would be 50-50, and there it
would stay. I happened to be in that picture and was asked by
the Joint Chiefs, "Is 50 per cent of the steel plate enough for the
Maritime Commission?" I said, "No, sir; not 50 per cent of a
million tons. But 50 ·per cent of 1,200,000 tons is adequate and
it. will be adequate for the Armed Forces." The attitude (!f the
steel industry was affected in the fact that the principal consumer,
the Maritime Commission, was satisfied. Although the Army and
Navy were strongly complaining about the production of steel
plate, the complacent Maritime Commission was getting enough,
was rather silent, was not a party to the effort for increased pro­
duction. If we put this new order through over the President's
signature, we were going to have the Maritime Commission also
protesting strongly. We predicted that under these conditions that
before we arrived in Cairo, the steel industry would be under such
pressure that it would agree to increas� the production of steel
plate. The order was signed by the President. We went to Cairo,
and the first dispatch on the t<;>p of the pile that I found on my
deskwas one from the deputy in Washington saying that the steel
industry had agreed to increase the production of plate steel ·to
. 1,200,000 tons in February, in spite of the fact that it was only a
28-day month.
On that basis, we were able to approve, that year, Normandy, 
the South of France, and the Philippines. Had that increase not 
resulted, certainly the Philippines and probably Normandy would 
have had to be reduced below essential requirements or delayed for ,, 
a period of a year because even with the increase, there was a 
leeway of only 100,000 tons in the Cairo plans in regard to plate 
steel. 
Therefore, the second thing which I wish to · emphasize is 
the danger of a unilateral demand. It applies equally to the use 
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of political power, lack of teamwork, and failure to consider the 
needs of the other fell ow in the team and how disruptive it can 
be to him. Therefore, it is to be avoided because we do not have . · · 
enough in war; and we must exercise not only economy but tE:am­
work so that distribution is in line with the greatest effort of all 
concerned. 
I will attempt to bring out other important lessons by use of 
additional examples because I think they are more instructive than 
generalities. 
Superfluous or unnecessary demands by any command are 
to be avoided. As an example of this, the British came over with a
demand in 1943, I think, for 95 repair ships and a 100,000 ton dry 
dock. We told them, yes, we would give them the necessary sup­
port, although it involved a great deal of critical material, but that 
we would have to break it down to See how much they actually needed 
in the support of approved operations. Briefly, when we broke it 
down, we could not justify more than 15 repair ships and no dry 
dock. There was considerable political pressure. on that. As a 
matter of fact, on that occasion, I was called to the White House 
and Mr. Roosevelt said, "You are apparently treating the British 
pretty roughly." "No, sir," I said. "We are giving them all that is 
justified to carry out approved operations and to that they agree."
This was a demand which, in its desire to build up to the possibilities 
rather than to the realities, represented the difference between ap­
proximately 100 per cent and 15 per cent on extremely critical naval 
construction which affected, in its turn, air and other construction. 
It illustrates the point that superfluous demands on the part of one 
military agency may and probably will diminish unnecessarily the 
capabilities of other commanders elsewhere. 
I got into trouble with the Air Force on a question involving 
faulty planning and thoughtless demands against other programs,· 
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which is to be avoided as poisonous to all-out effort. At one stage 
of the war, the Air Force and everybody else, realized the import­
ance of the B-29 program. So the Air Force came in and requested 
that the B-29's be constructed under over-riding priorities. Under 
that priority, people interested in a program could go into any fac­
tory or any production program, take out any tool, any workman, 
take over any factory, and divert any material for the construction, 
in the case I am referring to, of B-29's. It was not a question of 
the B-29's in and of themselves. It was a case of trying to build 
something without a plan. There was an idea that this privilege of 
getting these things in this manner without delay would expedite 
the construction of the B-29's. 
We fellows who had to make the recommendations were 
strongly against over-riding priorities, but we said, "If you will sub­
mit a plan of requirements, we guarantee- highest priority of all re­
quirements, and we believe that under such a plan more B-29's, 
rather than fewer, will be produced. Furthermore, such a procedure 
will not affect the programs of other type airplanes which are being 
utilized and which are, in their particular cases, essential to the 
pursuit of this war." 
There was quite a fight about that, and it was turned over to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There were some rather disagreeable 
words passed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, but I point again 
to the teamwork of those individuals in the Joint Chiefs when it was 
"Hap" Arnold himself, after hearing the case, who said, "'You 
gentlemen go out of here. Get your plan. There will be no over­
riding priority for the B-29." 
Results proved that the B-29 program proceeded expeditious­
ly and did not interfere with the production of other essential 
planes. 
I mention· that as a reason for not getting too enthusiastic 
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about the needs presented by one Service over the needs of another 
Service, or the demand for one type of ship, plane or whatever it 
might be, without due consideration of the effect of overemphasis on 
that type on the other types which, in their minor roles, are never­
theless essential. 
In modern warfarel the relationships between operational or 
strategic planning and logistics planning must be one of the utmost 
coordination and unity. The high command, and by that term I 
mean any command that issues operational orders, must insure that 
all orders are logistically feasible, otherwise, such orders are 
definitely faulty. Such high command must not only insure that 
the necessary support can be made available but that it wi,ll be 
made available at the designated times by the implementing logis­
tics agencies. The high command in the issuance of any proper 
operational order commits himself to this responsibility. 
Logistics, onthe scale of a World War, is truly a highly com­
plicated subject which involves procedures and operations beyond 
the ordinary appreciation. On the other hand, the determination of 
feasibility of plans even on a world wide scale, is comparatively sim­
ple because certain, essential items are always more difficult to pro­
duce in adequate quantity than the others and, therefore, these 
items become classified as critical and are the ones that form the 
"bottle-necks," so to speak, in the determination of feasibility. 
During World War II there were always between 10 and 20 
essential items that were always short of the overall demand. 
These included shipping, landing craft and engines, steel plate, 
electronics, aviation fuel, machine tools and a few others. "If 
these particular items were in shorter . supply than all of the 
thousands of others on the essential lists but nevertheless were 
available in sufficient quantity to support the plan under considera­
tion, then the responsible commander could be assured of the over-
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all feasibility of the operation." In simple terms, if a landing craft 
engine was a rarer item than a truck engine, the feasibility study 
gave consideration to the availability of the former and assumed 
that the latter could be supplied in sufficient quantity. 
In supporting an operation, there should be no such thing 
as 90 per cent supply of essential items, or 95 per cent, or even 99 
per cent. It should be 100 per cent or else the operation can be 
conducted only at a risk of failure. I have seen, in my experience, 
officers inclined to boast about Fleet supply ships being sent into 
forward areas with 93 per cent of the supply items on board. They 
were surprised when I showed a high degree of dissatisfaction. Ex­
perience had shown that the very seven per cent of items that were 
missing because they were semi-critical and in short supply in the 
home ports would be the very same items which would be in short 
supply and most urgently needed by the forces to be supplied. 
I recommend that in your consideration of the relationship 
between operations and logistics planning and direction you become 
accustomed to thinking in simple terms. All that I have said re­
garding command, logistics, feasibility, adequacy and so on, is basic 
and taken as a matter of routine in our day to day operations of a 
single ship. For example, the Captain issues orders to get under 
way at such and such a time for such and such a destination. He 
has received assurance from his navigator that the distance is 
within the cruising range of his ship; otherwise, he must provide 
for refueling en route. He receives a report from his Gunnery Of­
ficer, his Engineer, his Supply Officer and other heads of depart­
ments, that his ammunition, his fuel, his stores and his personnel 
are on board, as directed, and sufficient to carry out the operatipn; 
otherwise, he must provide for ti���ly replenishment. Here is a sim­
ple example of responsibility resting on command with regard to 
logistics. If you will think along these simple lines in the con-
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sideration of more complicated questions, I am sure that you will 
ordinarily find that the principles involved are the same. 
And before I close, I should like to cali to your attentio:q one 
of the most important, if not the most important principle that is 
involved in the command responsibilities of producing plans and 
directives that are sound operationally and also feasible of logistics 
support. 
In my opinion, there can be no action or evaluation on the 
part of any supporting logistics agency that will lead to greater 
or lesser meticulous care in the support of one part of an approved 
strategic or operational plan over another. To grant any discretion 
to such a supporting logistics agency regarding the need for sup­
port of any phase or part of such a plan is a fatal defect and, 
sooner or later, will result in disaster. All approved operations, 
large or small, regardless of geographical location, must be regard­
ed as essential components in the over-all effort and the means must 
be provided for timely success in each case. It goes back to the 
old adage, "For want of a nail, a shoe was lost." 
If the occasion arises when the logistics supply agencies 
find it impossible to render required services · at the designated 
times, they should ref er such facts to the responsible command 
. for his decision and action. Obviously, such information affects 
the determination of feasibility and may require his reconsideration 
of his plans and of their timing. On the other hand, if he has de­
termined his feasibility properly, such a negative report from a 
supporting logistics agency may mean a deferment of other projects 
of less urgency in order to provide the means available to go ahead 
with the support of his plans. 
During the war, such action was repeatedly necessary in all 
echelons of command responsibility. 
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As an example, the demands of the Cairo decisions required 
the increase of landing craft and engine program by about 300% 
for about four months. When the Bureau of Ships was confronted 
with this problem they required a very considerable increase in plate 
steel allocations and engine manufacturing plants and mechanics. 
They reported their additional needs to CNO who, in turn, took the 
matter up in the Joint Logistics Staff who, in turn, proposed defer­
ments in programs of trucks and other less critical items, and 
thereby assured the timely delivery of the required landing craft. 
Thus, the final important principle which . I wish to em­
phasize, involves the complete subordination of logistics supply and 
manufacturing agencies to the meticulous support of approved op­
erational plans. They must be uniformly imbued with a "can do" 
spirit and mµst undei: no circumstances exercise any independent 
judgment or thought regarding the relative importance of or need 
for supporting approved operational plans. We found by repeated 
experience during the War that the �xercise of this principle was 
essential to over-all timing of large and small approved operations, 
wherever they might be located geographically, in order that the 
planned effect on the enemy of world wide operations might im­
pose on him the maximum diversionary pressure and the maximum 
strategic disadvantage. Such considerations properly belong with 
the high command and under no circumstances can they be justi­
fiably controlled by judgment or actions by any supporting or sub­
ordinate agency. 
These are the reasons why operational planners and logistics 
planners must work together, think together and even "sleep 
together," in the attainment of the perfect coordination essential 
to the maximum effort. These are the reasons why any oper11,.j;ional 
plan before approval must be meticulously examined for feasibility 
and approved only after the practicability of full and complete sup-
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port have been determined. This is the reason why the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff must maintain sufficient controlling influence over the 
priorities of production and industrial and personnel allocations, to 
permit the adjustments necessary to maximum military effort; and 
.this is the reason why the Chief of Naval Operations must exercise 
control over his Logistics Bureaus and Agencies and all Fleet 
Commanders over their Service Forces, in order that they can as­
sure their subordinate operational commanders an unfailing and 
adequate supply of facilities and support essential to successful 
execution and accomplishment of the operations with which they 
are charged. 
These principles apply in my opinion in peace-time when the 
over-all limitations to the attainment of military readiness for war 
are expressed in terms of the taxpayer's dollar; as well as in war­
time when military accomplishment and intensity is limited by the 
industrial capacity of the nation. Neither in peace nor in war will 
these limiting factors permit sufficiency for all the things that 
we would like to do for the defense and security of our nation. But 
because these limitations do exist and do constantly impose on 
us the need for expending our effort in the most constructive and 
effective manner, our organizations, in peace or in war, must embody 
the means and determination to attain the maximum coordination 
between logistics and operational planners. Only in this way can our 
performances demonstrate that we have "done the best we could 
with what we had." 
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